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Abstract This study examines alternative understandings of democracy and democracy promotion 
advanced by the US, EU, Russia and China in Central Asia using frame analysis. In the context of this 
study, ‘frames’ refer to the relatively cohesive sets of beliefs, categories and value judgments as well as specific 
ways in which these ideas are packaged for the targets of international democratization. The study assesses the 
implications of alternative representations of democracy promotion and competing models of governance for the 
prospects of democratization in Central Asia. It concludes that the substance of the US and EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia has neglected the cultural and political contexts of these states, while the Russian 
and Chinese models of governance and development have provided a better match to the interests of the ruling 
elites.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of the newly independent states, 
the Western governments, non-governmental agencies and international organizations 
launched multiple assistance programs in the region in pursuit of varied foreign policy aims. 
There were legitimate concerns about the new governments’ ability to cope with the plethora 
of social, economic and security problems. There were also hopes that, with the Western 
help, these countries would transform themselves into open market economies and 
democratic states. In practice, however, the outcomes of international efforts at democracy 
promotion in the post-Soviet territory have not tallied with the donors’ expectations. The 
republics of Central Asian clearly manifest this trend.  
 It has long been assumed that the main sources of resistance to democracy in the 
region are rooted in the Central Asian authoritarian regimes (Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 2004; USAID 2011). The leaders of these states view genuine 
democracy as the gravest threat to their authority, and, therefore, resist all efforts at 
democracy promotion from abroad. While acknowledging considerable obstacles to 
democratization inhering in Central Asia, the study shifts its focus on the nature of 
democracy promotion policies themselves. It examines the substance of external initiatives 
of the United States, the European Union, Russia and China seeking to exercise their 
influence on the Central Asian states. The idea is to spotlight differences in perspectives on 
democracy and democracy promotion among Western donors and to show how the 
elasticity of these concepts enables even non-democratic governments to claim adherence to 
democratic norms. Furthermore, democracy and democracy promotion can be contested 
through the propagation of alternative governance forms. Which perspective dominates 
policy debates at any given time can substantially influence the outcomes of international 
democratization. 
To discern alternative ways in which democracy and democracy promotion are 
construed, presented, and contested in Central Asia, this study relies on the theoretical and 
methodological particulars of frame analysis, a theoretical perspective and methodological 
approach for examining people’s perception and representation of social and physical reality. 
In the broadest meaning, the notion of ‘frames’ denotes relatively cohesive sets of beliefs, 
assumptions, categories, and value judgments as well as specific ways in which these are 
packaged for the targets of international democratization (Entman 1993; Schön and Rein 
1994). Discussed at greater length in section two, these two aspects of frames – as 
conceptual scaffolds and discursive representations - are consistent with the conceptual and 
discursive dimensions of the substance of democracy promotion featured in this special issue 
(see introductory article). Since the practices of democracy promotion are informed by the 
language that imparts them with meanings and implicated in their social representations, this 
study also overviews the implementation priorities pursued by the US and EU in Central 
Asia. This analytical angle is consistent with the implementation dimension of the substance 
of democracy promotion.  
The study begins with the introduction of the framing perspective and a brief 
discussion of the methodological aspects of research. Next, it presents the US and EU 
democracy promotion frames established on the basis of some common aspects of 
representation of democracy promotion in the language of their policy statements. This is 
followed by the analysis of views and perspectives on democracy and democratization 
advocated by Russia and China along with their discursive presentations of the alternative 
models of governance. The last section of the study provides a summary and comparative 
analysis of the alternative interpretations of democracy and international democratization 
and assesses their implications for the prospects of democracy promotion in Central Asian 
states. 
 
 
Framing Perspective on Democracy Promotion  
 
The ontogenesis of the framing perspective is credited to Erving Goffman, a Canadian-born 
sociologist who argued that individual experiences were organized around basic cognitive 
structures imparting meanings on events that would otherwise be meaningless to people 
(Goffman 1974). What Goffman termed ‘frames,’ modern psychologists often refer to as 
‘cognitive models’, ‘schemas’, or ‘scripts’ rendering an occurrence meaningful and shaping 
future expectations. In other words, frames, cognitive models, and other mental models are 
ways to describe the nature of thought processes that underlie individuals’ perceptions, views 
and decision-making.  
Over the course of development of the framing perspective in multiple disciplines – 
psychology, management and organizational studies, linguistics, sociology, communications 
and media studies, to name a few - frames as ‘mini-theories’ assisting individuals in 
interpreting the world have been theoretically differentiated from frames that are deliberately 
manufactured for making some aspects of reality more salient than others (Entman 1993, 52; 
Goffman 1974, 10). It is in this second meaning that the framing perspective has been 
predominantly utilized in political science research exploring the role of political issue 
definitions for agenda setting and formation of voters’ preferences (Daviter 2007). Despite 
gaining increasing popularity in the literature on policy making and public opinion, framing 
perspective has been underutilized in the studies of international relations. The topic of 
democracy promotion, however, is particularly suitable for frame analysis.  
Democracy and democracy promotion are organized set of ideas reflecting social 
experiences with certain political processes and institutions, meanings that have been 
ascribed to these practices over time, and expectations of certain types of behaviour 
consistent with these concepts. The contributions to this special issue convincingly 
demonstrate the importance of donors’ own experiences with democracy and the secondary 
role of recipients’ needs in shaping their understanding of democracy and democracy 
promotion. As the democratic experiences of societies differ, so do the meanings of 
democracy and derivative terms. Today, there exist a range of theoretical perspectives and 
meanings of these terms reflected in different political models of democracy. The concept of 
frames is meant to discern the structure of meanings that concepts, such as democracy and 
democracy promotion, carry with them to provide the content to these concepts. 
Since conceptual meanings are inseparable from experiences that both inform and 
embody them, ideas manifest themselves through behavioural and verbal communication. 
Democracy and democracy promotion ‘exist’ through the day-to-day practices of democracy 
and democracy assistance and discourse. It is through the language as a complex system of 
words, rules, structures and associated meanings that strategies and instruments of 
international democratization become intelligible for targets and agents of democratization. 
Frame analysis is a method for analysing communications or discourse. It is premised on the 
idea that any issue described in the language of concepts can be approached from different 
perspectives and conveyed in different ways, and these varied representations can appeal to 
different sets of values, considerations, and audiences (Druckman 2004).  
For the purpose of this study, I consider frames as unconsciously used ‘mini-
theories’ about democracy or alternative forms of governance, but also conscious efforts at 
representing these issues with the purpose of influencing perceptions and actions of other 
states. This is because foreign policy statements often contain direct appeals to the targets of 
communication issued with the goal of effecting a behavioural change in them. These 
deliberate attempts at presenting an issue in certain ways are also reflective of the ‘broadly 
shared beliefs, values, and perspectives familiar to the members of a societal culture’ (Schön 
and Rein 1994, p. xiii). In other words, the discourses of democracy promoters are not 
independent of their ideas about international democratization. Although these two aspects 
of frames are interrelated, I differentiate them for the analytical purposes and greater 
consistency with the conceptual dimensions of the substance of democracy promotion 
adopted in this special issue. ‘Frames’ will denote the mental conceptual scaffolds of 
democracy promoters, whereas ‘framing’ will be used to designate a discursive process by 
which the agents of normative influence promote a particular understanding of democracy 
and democracy promotion by selecting some normative claims, assumptions, and causal 
explanations and packaging them in such ways as to affect perceptions and actions of the 
targets of communication.  
Frames are commonly analysed from the actual language of official documents using 
techniques of discourse analyses. I content analysed a sample of 54 speeches and documents 
pertaining to the topic of democracy and democracy promotion from the US and EU, and 
36 – from Russia and China. To ensure the comparability of documents, I selected foreign 
policy and security concepts, strategies toward Central Asia, and major speeches of the key 
foreign policy makers from each international actor. Several search strategies were used to 
identify the documents. Lexus-Nexus Academic search engine was used to identify texts with 
high relevance to the topic of democracy and democratization and also select those texts that 
were widely cited in international and local press. The lists of speeches and documents were 
triangulated through citations appearing in Western, Russian, and Chinese publications on 
the US and EU strategies of democracy promotion and resistance to international 
democratization by Russia and China. 
The conceptual understanding of frames as conceptual scaffolds and discursive 
representations guided my content analysis of the documents. To discern the mental frames, 
I examined whether the agents speaking on behalf of states converge on a particular 
understanding of democracy, what this understanding entails, and what differences, if any, 
transpire in the official discourse on democratization. Using a popular conceptualization of 
democracy as consisting of two basic components – electoral (free and fair elections) and 
liberal (rule of law and human rights) – I asked what practices and institutions go into the 
making of democracy and democracy assistance, whether those practices are treated as 
universal or not, and what beliefs and values underpin these understandings. To study 
discursive representations of these issues, I read the documents with the view of discerning 
those aspects of the understanding of democracy that are prioritized in the discourse as 
evidenced from the sheer number of references to certain dimensions of democratization 
and interpretations used in reference to them.  
In terms of the agents of democracy promotion speaking on behalf of the US, I 
selected the US presidents, US Congress and Department of State, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). These are the institutions that together define, 
communicate, and implement initiatives associated with democracy promotion (for further 
discussion, see Melia 2005). The majority of texts examined for this study were published 
after 2000, a year that brought to power a new administration of President Bush in the US, 
and President Putin in Russia. The former, an outspoken proponent of democracy 
promotion, articulated a position that has become associated with the US perspective on 
international democratization. President Putin, whose first two terms passed under the 
banner of restoring Russia’s great power status in global politics, reinvigorated Moscow’s 
foreign policy in Central Asia. His administration launched ideological crusade against the 
Western efforts at promoting democracy worldwide. 
In the context of the EU, where the main competences for the design and 
implementation of democracy promotion programs reside in the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers, I analysed the key policy documents related to democracy 
promotion in Central Asia issued by these agencies and their representatives since 2005. A 
shorter timeframe is selected due to a major overhaul of the instruments of the EU 
cooperation with Central Asia that began happening around that time.  
Neither Russia nor China is a democracy promoter in the same sense as the EU and 
US. However, both Moscow and Beijing have stated openly their positions on democracy 
and international democratization and disseminated their own views and ideas about the 
proper forms of governments to domestic and international audiences. Some of these ideas 
and expectations have been embedded in Russian and Chinese foreign policy expressions 
toward the Central Asian states, or included into their own security doctrines and national 
policies (Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner 2010; Kavalski 2007). To discern the Russian and 
Chinese perspectives on democracy and democratization, I examined statements of the 
Russian and Chinese leaders – presidents, prime ministers, and foreign policy ministers in 
Russia, and General Secretaries of the Communist Party of China (CCP), members of 
Politburo, presidents, and vice-presidents in China. Despite the emergence of new forces 
affecting politics and foreign policies in these states, foreign policy decision-making is still 
centralized in Russia and China and decisively shaped by the president or leaders of the CCP 
in tandem with a small circle of political elites. 
 
 
Western democracy promotion frames  
 
Immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union, both the US and EU expressed 
interest in engaging with the states of Central Asia. Initially, it was the US that became their 
prime benefactor of democracy assistance formalized in the 1992 Freedom for Russia and 
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act and a series 
of bi-lateral agreements (Yazdani 2007). In the 1990s, the EU-Central Asia cooperation was 
largely limited to technical, humanitarian, and economic assistance stemming from the 
individual Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) signed with Central Asian 
states1 (Urdze 2011). 
 The 9/11 attacks rekindled a flurry of American and European activity in Central 
Asia. Security concerns in addition to energy considerations became more prominent in the 
US and EU relations with Central Asian states. Despite the elevated strategic importance of 
the region, the official discourses of the US and EU administrations continued playing up 
their normative commitments to these states by rendering democracy assistance as a 
necessary, if not inevitable, element of their foreign policy. President Bush rhetorically 
elevated the goal of democracy promotion to the primary mission of the US (Bush 2005). He 
and the members of his administration reasserted the US commitment to the strengthening 
of democratic rule and market institutions in Central Asia in almost every statement 
addressed to the Central Asian states.  
In the first six months of the new American administration, President Obama and 
the key members of his cabinet avoided any references to democracy promotion. Yet, the 
discourse of democracy assistance resurfaced later and was shaped by President Obama’s 
speeches delivered during his trips to Cairo, Egypt and Accra, Ghana in the summer of 2009 
(Carothers 2012; Muravchik 2009). The US documents that were guiding the new 
administration’s efforts at democracy assistance reaffirmed the US government’s 
determination to pursue international democratization (H.R. 989; White House 2010).  
In the context of the EU, the advancement of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law were also named as the key principles and top objectives of its foreign, security and 
development policy (see, for example, Council of the European Union 2005; European 
Commission 2006; European Council 2003) (see Bridoux and Kurki in this special issue for 
conceptual and ideological differences in the US and EU understanding of democracy). 
Although democracy promotion has been often flanked by security, energy and development 
policy, democracy has become an important policy commitment to which the EU has tied 
itself rhetorically, financially and bureaucratically (Kurki 2011). 
 
Substance of the US democracy promotion 
 
When used in the American political lexicon, the word ‘democracy’ typically denotes some 
combination of free and fair elections, competitive multi-party political system, independent 
judiciary, and civil and political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.2 Under the leadership 
of President Bush, democracy has been portrayed as a universal value and entitlement of 
people in developing and developed countries alike. It has been presented as a historical 
destiny, the only recipe for national success, and a token for being considered as a modern 
                                                            
1 Turkmenistan never ratified the PCA with the EU.  
2 The US policy documents reiterate these same components of democracy. See, for example, Chapter 89  
‘Advancing Democratic Values, Sections 8201-8262’ (H.R. 982); USAID, “At Freedom’s Frontiers: A 
Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework” (USAID, 2005). 
nation (see, for example, Bush 2005; White House 2006, 2010). While not relinquishing the 
idea of universal democracy, the discourse of the Obama cabinet underscored the 
universality of certain principles, including justice, progress, tolerance, education, security, 
and peace (Obama 2009). 
A belief in the universality of democracy has informed the US government’s resolve 
at democracy promotion in other nations. Under both the Bush and Obama administrations, 
advancing democracy abroad has been construed as an extension of the US’s own practices 
and experiences with democracy, which are presumed to be universal. President Bush 
succinctly summarized this perspective by asserting that the ‘self-evident truths’ of American 
founding fathers were true for American people, and, therefore, ‘they are true for all’ (as 
quoted in Mullerson 2009, 51). 
Embraced by both Republicans and Democrats alike, the goal of democracy 
promotion has been nourished by the deep-seated beliefs about the virtues of democracy 
and some strategic considerations. Democracy has been construed as the best form of 
government because its institutions create the best political conditions for enhancing 
individual liberties and safeguarding individual freedoms (White House 2010). Democracy 
has been vested with an instrumental value by linking it to security and peace (White House 
2006; 2010). President Bush and his foreign policy advisors regarded the frailty of 
democratic institutions as the root cause of terrorism, and democracy promotion as a tool 
for ending tyranny and terror (Carothers 1999, 3; McFaul 2010, 1). Even the most vocal 
opponents of the Bush administration’s measures supported the US efforts at international 
democratization with the understanding that ‘America will be safer’ in a world of democratic 
states (Kerry 2005). 
Despite the consensus on the importance of democracy in US foreign policy, there 
are important differences in the understanding of democracy promotion within the 
American administration. The US Congress adopted a comprehensive approach to 
democracy assistance defined as the support for ‘good governance, human rights, 
independent media, and the rule of law’ and strengthening ‘the capacity of democratic 
political parties, and citizens’ (Senate Appropriations Committee 2005; see also H.R. 982). 
President Bush and members of his administration prioritized the right to conduct free and 
fair elections. The Bush government, for example, hailed the ‘Tulip’ revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan that unseated the first Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, and the presidential 
elections that followed. It backed the OSCE’s critical assessment of Kazakhstan’s electoral 
practices and expressed disappointment with the outcomes of its presidential elections 
lacking genuine political pluralism. By 2005, references to human rights became less 
common in the rhetoric of President Bush supplanted with the frequent affirmations of 
strategic partnership between the US and Central Asia republics. Only the US Congress and, 
occasionally, the State Department continued censuring the Central Asian governments for 
oppressing human rights. In response to criticisms of working closely with the authoritarian 
regimes, President Bush once responded, ‘The more people… work with the US, the more 
likely it is that they will work to improve the human condition’ (Mukhanetrakhimova 2005). 
In the first year of the Obama administration, the official discourse arising from the 
government officials integrated democracy with other less politically sensitive subjects, such 
as development and good governance, fight against corruption, support for religious 
freedom, and gender equality (Muravchik 2009). Over time, the discourse of democracy 
promotion has again zeroed in on the competitive political process and accountable and 
transparent government as the two primary dimensions of democratization. Following the 
2010 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, President Obama declared that an orderly and 
peaceful transfer of power in the Kyrgyz parliament was a hallmark of a ‘true democracy” in 
this country (Obama 2010). In his congratulatory statement, President Obama stressed that 
the outcome of parliamentary elections was still not known on the day of the vote, and this 
fact alone was sufficient to assert a democratic breakthrough in Kyrgyzstan (Obama 2010).   
The Obama cabinet has softened the language of its condemnations of human rights 
practices in Central Asia and waived the Bush-era restrictions on military aid to Uzbekistan. 
The latter sanctions were imposed on the country in the aftermath of the 2005 massacre in 
Andijan. The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, defended the government’s decision by 
invoking moderate improvements in Uzbekistan’s human rights situation and pointing out 
the importance of strategic partnership with Uzbekistan (IA Rosbalt 2011). Overall, the US 
discourse toward Central Asian republics under the Obama administration has become 
increasingly focused on their stability, prosperity, and security. The emphasis has shifted 
from democracy to mutually productive relations between the US and Central Asian states.  
Despite the narrow framing of democracy promotion by the American administrations, the 
policy implementation priorities have been in line with the US Congress regulations. In 
addition to the competitive political process dimension, the practical side of the US 
democracy promotion encompasses three other pillars: human rights and the rule of law; 
civil society; and democratic and accountable governance (USAID 2005). In the context of 
Central Asia, democracy promotion activities have been scattered across these four 
dimensions.  
Since the political space for promoting competitive political processes has been 
closed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, this implementation priority has been ascribed to 
Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, 
governance projects constitute the cornerstone of democratic engagement by the US 
administration. Substantively, the US assistance along this dimension has focused on the 
development of electoral capacities and election monitoring skills of political parties and civil 
society groups. This emphasis corresponds to the discursive frame of democracy promotion 
emphasising elections. Although the documents published by the US government and 
USAID demonstrate growing awareness of the importance of fostering a democratic 
citizens’ culture, the majority of proposed and implemented initiatives aim at the people’s 
mobilization for elections rather than nurturing the sustainable culture of citizen 
participation in democratic processes. Human rights have also been de-prioritized in the 
democracy promotion initiatives in Central Asia and promoted through scattered projects 
focusing on religious freedom and the rights of children and women.  
 
Substance of the EU democracy promotion 
 
Whether or not the EU should adopt an official definition of democracy to guide its 
democracy promotion efforts has been a subject of continuing debate within the Union 
(Meyer-Resende 2009). To this date, however, there is no a formal definition of democracy 
in the EU. Instead, the Union’s 27 members feature their own varieties of democratic 
governance shaped by their unique historical circumstances, politics, and culture (this is 
exemplified in Petrova’s contribution to the special issue). The Union’s founding documents, 
foreign policy instruments and official communications typically mention ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’, ‘democratization processes’, ‘the rule of law’, and transparent, 
effective, and accountable government as essential elements of democracy. Beyond what has 
been formally stated in the Union’s documents, the discourse and practice of democratic 
governance in the EU members reviewed in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth paper 
(2008) identified regular, free and fair elections, constitutionalism, freedom of political 
expression, media, and association, access to information, rule of law, basic human rights, 
and support for democracy promotion as the elements of governance that are common to all 
democracies within the EU. 
 Beliefs in the importance of democracy to the EU’s own development and 
integration shaped its conviction that democracy represents the best form of government. 
The EU officials insist that since the EU itself stands for democracy, it is only ‘natural’ for 
the Union to promote this system of governance in other states (Pace 2009). Consequently, 
the development and consolidation of democracy worldwide has become a key objective of 
the EU foreign and security policy and its development cooperation. Similarly to the US, 
democracy promotion in the EU is instilled with both normative and strategic 
considerations. The Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy, and Development adopted 
by the Council of the EU in 1991 states that democratization is not only desirable in itself 
but also necessary for sustained socio-economic growth. In 2006, the Council reiterated that 
‘the embedding of democracy and democratic process in third countries’ offers ‘the best 
prospect for the development … of effective policies related to global issues of particular 
concern to EU citizens’ (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 2006). 
Furthermore, democracy has been regarded as an effective way of dealing with security 
problems (European Council 2003).  
The EU’s commitment to democratization was reaffirmed in its 2002 Strategy Paper 
for Central Asia, which explicitly listed democracy, human rights and free market as the basic 
principles for a deeper EU-Central Asia cooperation. Democracy is named as one of the 
seven priorities in the Council’s 2007 ‘Strategy for a New Enhanced Partnership with Central 
Asia’ (European Council 2007) but is mentioned only indirectly as part of the ‘good 
governance and economic reform’ package in the European Commission’s Regional Strategy 
paper for assistance to Central Asia over the period of 2007-2013 (European Commission 
2007). The latter document reflects a change in the discursive framing of EU’s democracy 
promotion where the goal of democracy now frequently appears together with or 
interchangeably with ‘good governance’ (European Commission 2006). The new EU Special 
Representative for Central Asia Ambassador Patricia Flor, similarly to her predecessor 
Ambassador Pierre Morel, underscored good governance along with human rights, the rule 
of law and democratization as priority areas in her mission of deepening EU-Central Asia 
cooperation (Delegation of the EU to Uzbekistan 2012).  
Both the rule of law and human rights represent the key elements of the conceptual 
understanding of democracy in the EU as expressed in the Union’s formal documents and 
statements. In its communications with the governments of Central Asia, the European 
Parliament has repeatedly pointed out the regrettable departure of their practices from these 
normative commitments. The EU representatives called on the Central Asian leadership to 
make sincere efforts in improving the deteriorating situation with human rights. In recent 
years, however, the themes of development, security, and energy cooperation superseded the 
rhetoric of human rights (see, for example, Ashton 2012a, 2012b). As High Representative 
of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, explained ahead of her 
trip to Central Asia in November 2012, the key issues of mutual interest for the EU and 
states of Central Asia include, “security and regional cooperation, energy, environment and 
water as well as other priority areas […] such as education, rule of law, human rights […] By 
supporting reform and transformation we [the EU] hope to encourage trade and investment’ 
(Ashton 2012a). 
Consistent with the findings of other contributions in this issue, this study found 
that the EU’s strategies for Central Asia place considerable emphasis on good governance, 
particularly assistance to administrative and financial capacity building of Central Asian 
administrations (European Commission 2007; European Council 2007). The emphasis on 
governance is not surprising as it is viewed as a tie-in between the EU economic and energy 
interests and commitments to the principles of democracy and human rights. It also tallies 
with the Union’s underlying beliefs and values that democracy, development and security are 
mutually reinforcing (European Council 2003). The rule of law is another implementation 
aspect that is conspicuous in the Union’s documents. The importance attached to this goal is 
evidenced in the agreement on a special Rule of Law Initiative negotiated by the European 
Council and Commission and a series of Ministerial conferences that sprang from this 
initiative. Substantively, the EU’s rule of law dimension of democracy promotion has 
stressed efficiency and modernization of adjudication, reforms in the area of commercial 
jurisdiction, and changes to criminal and administrative law (Schuster 2011).3 As such, the 
official language of the rule of law initiative harmonizes with the overall emphasis on good 
governance as an effective public management and public administration. 
Human rights have not been included as a separate priority area in the EU’s Strategy 
for cooperation with Central Asia. Instead, they have been framed as almost a by-product of 
the rule of law initiatives and judicial reform. The European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) is a specialized EU programme launched in 2006 for providing 
direct support to democracy, civil society and human rights protection 4 . The EIDHR, 
however, is a global instrument, which is not geared specifically for Central Asia. In the 
Central Asian countries, it has followed an established human rights agenda, which 
emphasizes judicial and procedural, civil rights and freedoms, rights of defenders and human 
rights activists, and cooperation with the relevant international organizations (Axyonova 
2011a, 2011b; Emerson and Boonstra 2010). This agenda has been implemented in the 
format of the human rights dialogue with representatives of the Central Asian 
administrations. 
This is not to suggest that the Union relinquished its assistance to political processes 
in Central Asia. The EU continues sending election observers to the region, implement 
projects on parliamentary reforms, and provide limited direct support to civil society groups. 
However, these ‘traditional’ dimensions of the EU democracy promotion have been de-
prioritised in the key policy documents of the EU for Central Asia. Overall, the EU 
democracy promotion frame appears to be following a model underlying European 
integration, namely, it is expected that support for a market-based economy, a managerial 
culture, and regional economic integration will provide for the eventual democratic 
transformation in Central Asian states. Even more so than the US, the EU has been ‘blind’ 
towards local cultures and traditions relying, instead, on the ‘off-the-shelf’ initiatives 
approbated in different contexts.   
 
 
Non-Western frames of democracy and alternative models of governance   
 
                                                            
3 Judicial reform also entails measures aimed at the optimization of legal procedures, improvement of working 
methods of law enforcement agencies, and greater accessibility of citizens and businesses to legal system. 
4 The EIDHR should be distinguished from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR). 
Neither Russia nor China has promoted their views on governance as actively as the US and 
EU. Still, a greater predictability of Central Asian politics and securing the region for 
realizing their own economic and political goals has been desired by both states (Kerr 2010). 
Moscow and Beijing, therefore, have sought some convergence between their own and 
Central Asian states’ perspectives on governance and international relations (Bader, 
Grävingholt, and Kästner 2010; Kavalski 2007). Russia and China have espoused a set of 
competing ideas for political and economic development, and presented attractive models 
for maintaining stability and generating prosperity without democratization (Jackson 2010; 
Kavalski 2010a, 2010b). 
 
Russia’s views on democracy and governance  
 
References to democracy are a rare occurrence in the Russian foreign policy discourse. When 
the word ‘democracy’ was mentioned in the recent foreign policy declarations, it was used in 
reference to ‘democratic world order’ and ‘democratic international relations’. These idioms 
along with the words containing the prefix ‘multi-’ (as in multi-channel and multi-
dimensional) convey a vision of the multi-polar world older and a system of collective 
mechanisms for addressing global problems where Russia plays an important role recognized 
by other states (Lavrov 2005). ‘Democratic’ in the expression ‘democratic world order’ 
implies Russia’s equal right to take part in the decision-making processes in the global realm. 
It also denotes a form of resistance to any form of ideological or cultural hegemony and 
American unilateralism (Ambrosio 2008).  
The notion of democracy has also appeared in references to Russia as a democratic 
state and used for an explicit purpose of legitimation of Moscow’s governing regime. By 
calling their state democratic, the Russian authorities make no pretences to the Western idea 
of liberal democracy. Rather, their policy statements refer to the ‘unique and indigenous’ 
model of democracy developed in the context of Russia (Shlapentokh 2007 as cited in 
Jackson 2010, 105). This model of ‘democracy’ is premised on the idea of the strong state as 
a fundamental condition for Russia’s national survival and an important factor in the success 
of its political, security and economic reforms. The Russian leadership has advocated this 
perspective by stating, repeatedly, how the establishment of a strong state was a prerequisite 
for the revival of Russia’s great power status (Jackson 2010). Strong state has been framed as 
an enduring feature of the Russian political tradition, which has also favoured a popular 
leader personifying the sovereign state irrespective of his democratic credentials (Smith 
2006). The legality and efficacy of the strong state has been defended through discursive 
linking of the state-controlled government to stability and prosperity in Russia. 
In parallel to their efforts at promoting Russia’s own model of governance, the 
Russian leadership has portrayed democracy promotion programmes sponsored from the 
West as illegitimate and perilous. The Russian government’s discourse has tinged the 
revolutionary changes in several post-Soviet countries with pejorative connotations, framing 
them as an on-going process of colonization and domination of the former Communist 
states by the West (Silitski 2010). In place of public criticisms of the growing 
authoritarianism of Central Asian governments, the Russian authorities have granted 
approval to political processes in these states by endorsing the results of elections and 
assisting their leadership in countering Western pressures to democratize (Jackson 2010).  
What lies beneath the Russian ideological model is the conviction of the Russian 
leadership in the pre-eminence of security and order and indisputable role of the strong state 
in accomplishing these aims. Although the issue of democracy was brought up in Vladimir 
Putin’s 2012 inaugural speech, it was the themes of stability and continuity that were 
foregrounded in the address (Belyaeva 2012). The prioritization of order, security and 
stability in the Russian discourse is further reinforced by its foreign and domestic policies 
and actions. Domestically, the ‘Putin model’ has become associated with an effective, if 
underhand and illegal, use of administrative resources to ensure the desired electoral 
outcomes. It has come to denote an unquestionable state authority over the country’s 
institutions, strict control over mass media and civil society, and suppression of civil liberties 
and dissent.  
 
China’s views on democracy and governance  
 
Unlike the US and EU and even less so then Russia, China has not aspired to transpose its 
political values and views on other states. The strategic interests of China, rather than 
ideological affinity, have determined Beijing’s foreign relations (Nathan and Scobell 2012). 
Still, the ever-expanding Chinese global interactions and a desire to play a greater role on a 
range of economic and security questions have increased transparency of Chinese politics 
allowing other states to learn some lessons from Beijing (Sutter 2005, 2008). China’s soft 
power has also risen in conjunction with its growing economy and political stature in 
international relations. Although, the core of China’s soft power is still its art, literature, 
philosophy, and culture, Chinese officials and diplomats have become more adroit in 
promoting their country’s international status (Nathan and Scobell 2012, 321; Sum 2012). 
The ideas of peace, harmony, tolerance, solidarity, and unity have been foregrounded in 
Beijing’s foreign policy discourse. The Chinese strategists have also pointed out to Beijing’s 
success in maintaining political stability and persistent economic growth that have shown 
some appeal to authoritarian governments, including those of Central Asia states. 
In the rhetoric of Chinese leaders, China’s foreign image and legitimacy of the CCP 
have been discursively linked to the sustained development and modernization of Chinese 
economy and political stability, rather than adherence to democratization. The scant 
references to democracy in the official speeches of Chinese leaders fade in comparison to 
the volume of security-related topics and economic themes.5 Discussions of democracy by 
the Chinese leaders are typically provoked by the Western censure of the human rights 
situation in China and derailment of democratic reforms. Similarly to Russia, the Chinese 
communist regime has defended China’s own path to democratic development and 
modernization determined by the unique national conditions (Nathan 1990, 193). Consistent 
with the Marxist doctrine, democratic reforms are viewed as part of the superstructure that 
cannot develop in isolation from the material conditions constituting the country’s economic 
base. Therefore, premature and rapid political reforms are framed as disastrous for China. 
The Chinese embassies around the world dedicate pages to the discussion of the 
‘democratic mode of China’ portrayed as different from that of Europe and US because of 
their country’s history, economy, traditions, and culture. It is argued that simply because 
Chinese democratic practices differ from those of the US and EU, it is unreasonable to 
accuse China of lacking democracy. Similarly to their Russian counterparts, Chinese leaders 
deny the existence of the ‘universal’ democratic models. They also repeatedly accuse the 
hypocrisy of the Western capitalist democracy tolerating human rights violations and 
                                                            
5 It should be noted, however, that democracy has become a more popular topic of discussion on Chinese 
social forums on the Internet. 
condemn it for excessive individualism responsible for the rise of immoral behaviour and 
violence. 
The Chinese strategists also articulated a number of theoretical positions designed to 
push back against what is perceived as the Western use of democratic arguments to wield 
control over China. Since the 1980s, Beijing has been supporting the idea of culturally 
unique Asian values promoted by East Asian semi-authoritarian regimes, such as Singapore 
and Malaysia. The thrust of this position is that Asian values do not give freedoms and 
liberties the same importance as it is accorded in the West, but prioritize obedience, thrift, 
industriousness, respect for elders, and authority (Nathan and Scobell 2012, 331). Given 
important difference between Western and Asian value systems, Asian states, including 
China, must be faithful to their own political and normative priorities. The counter-model of 
governance and rights promulgated by China stresses the authority of a wise and benevolent 
leadership and puts states’ rights before individuals’ rights (Bell 2000; Sen 1997). It also 
prioritizes social and economic progress and development over civil and political rights, the 
community over the individual, and social order and stability over democracy and individual 
freedoms. China’s model of gradual neo-liberal and market-oriented development that takes 
place without concurrent transformation of political institutions has been dubbed as the 
‘Beijing consensus’ that the Chinese commentators portrayed as more efficient and just 
version of capitalism than the formerly dominant ‘Washington consensus’ (Nathan and 
Scobell 2012, 319).  
The current Chinese leadership firmly believes that the US administration aspires to 
weaken and eventually topple the Chinese communist regime through ideological 
subversion, among other means (Friedberg 2012). Beijing, therefore, has shared with Russia 
a sense of annoyance over Western democracy promotion and viewed any meddling into its 
internal affairs or domestic politics of the neighbouring states as a threat (Kavalski 2007, 50). 
According to the Chinese interpretation of international law and the principle of sovereignty, 
states are the primary subjects of international law that vests them with authority in domestic 
politics and responsibilities vis-à-vis their people. The interference of one state into the 
domestic affairs of another for human rights purpose or under other pretexts is illegitimate 
and tantamount to cultural imperialism. 
The Chinese model is also underpinned by an assumption that there can be no 
development without social stability and order. The Chinese government has repeatedly 
stated that it will ‘make progress while maintaining stability’ (Xinhuanet 2012). The 
consolidation of political power is viewed as paramount, and a strong state is deemed to be 
the foundation of all progress. The main task of the state, according to the Chinese 
government, is not to represent the people’s will, but to ensure group harmony, stability and 
social order (Naisbitt and Naisbitt 2010). For China, economic stability is an indispensible 
component of overall stability. Therefore, the Chinese government has emphasized 
development and economic cooperation beneficial to the economic interests of China in its 
foreign relations with Central Asian states.  
To sum up, what emerged as an alternative to Western liberal democracy in the 
Russian and Chinese discourse is a unique form of governance and development where the 
state holds a prominent position buttressed by a viable economic base. This model gives 
priority to economic development and modernization prior to any political liberalization. 
The Chinese model of development has also become associated with gradual and 
incremental reforms. As the parliamentary chief and Politburo Standing Committee member 
Wu Bangguo explained, if China wavers under the destructive democratization forces, ‘the 
fruits of development that we have already achieved will be lost and the country could even 
fall into the abyss of civil strife’ (AFP 2011). The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, also 
became a keen supporter of the gradual approach. In his statements, Putin spoke of political 
transformation as a process, not a quick destination, and stressed a path of gradual evolution 
of Russia toward an improved judicial system, a fully representative parliament and other 
political outcomes (Putin 2012). 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
 
Table 1 contains a summary of the results of the frame analysis presented in the study. At 
the formal level of the US Congress laws and EU foundational documents, the US and EU 
share a similar understanding of democracy as a set of institutions and procedures – 
elections, civil and political rights, and the rule of law. Yet, in their discursive presentations 
and implementation priorities, the US democracy promoters tend to emphasize competitive 
political processes and elections, whereas the EU’s representatives, until recently, alluded to 
human rights and the rule of law as the counterparts and inevitable elements of democracy. 
However, since the adoption of the 2007 strategic documents on Central Asia references to 
human rights have become less frequent in the Union’s statements, whereas the notion of 
‘governance’ has been prioritized. The American and European support for democracy and 
international democratization is grounded in the deep-seated beliefs in the intrinsic and 
strategic values of democracy. The US has often framed its democracy promotion efforts as 
a predestined mission, whereas the EU has focused largely on the consequences of 
democracy for security, development and regional integration. 
 
 
Table 1. Democracy Promotion Frames of the US, EU, Russia and China  
 
 US EU Russia  China  
Understanding 
of democracy 
A set of 
democratic 
institutions 
(elections, multi-
party system, civil 
and political 
rights, rule of law, 
etc.) based on 
American 
example 
Not articulated, 
but references are 
made to the 
European states’ 
democratic 
practices. 
‘Democracy’ 
appears in a 
bundle with good 
governance, 
economic 
development, and 
human rights 
A form of 
government 
that is 
consistent with 
national 
circumstances 
(strong state led 
by a popular 
leader for 
Russia). 
International 
principle 
allowing for 
equal 
participation of 
states in solving 
world problems 
and recognizing 
diversity of 
A form of 
government 
consistent with 
Asian values 
and economic 
development (a 
model that 
prioritizes 
economic 
progress over 
human rights, 
community 
over 
individuals, and 
social order 
over 
democracy for 
China) 
worldviews 
Values and 
beliefs 
underlying this 
understanding 
Democracy is the 
best form of 
governance and a 
solution to 
problems of war 
and terrorism 
US is predestined 
to promote 
democracy 
Democracy is the 
best form of 
governance and a 
precondition for 
development and 
stability 
Security and 
order are 
preeminent; 
state is the main 
guarantor of 
security and 
order 
Economic and 
political 
stability, 
security, and 
order. Gradual 
reform of 
institutions 
Aspects of 
democracy 
prioritized in 
discourse 
Political 
participation, 
elections 
Human rights 
and the rule of 
law. Good 
governance since 
2005 
Illegitimacy and 
danger of 
Western 
democracy 
promotion. 
Universal 
democracy does 
not exist  
Western 
democracy is 
incompatible 
with Asian 
values. State 
legitimacy 
hinges on 
sustained 
economic 
growth, not 
democracy  
How 
democracy is 
framed for 
Central Asia 
Citizen 
participation, 
democratic and 
accountable 
governance, rule 
of law. Less often 
- human rights 
Good 
governance, rule 
of law and 
judicial reforms. 
Human rights are 
under-prioritized. 
 
Non-
interference in 
domestic 
affairs, strong 
state, strong 
leadership, 
economic 
development  
Support for 
unique and 
indigenous 
models of 
democracy; 
non-
interference in 
domestic affairs
What is being 
emphasized in 
practice 
Electoral 
capacities & 
political 
participation  
 
Administrative 
and financial 
capacity building, 
transparency, 
accountability, 
and fight with 
corruption 
Support for 
governing 
regimes, 
political 
stability, 
security  
Political 
stability, 
economic 
development  
 
The Russian and Chinese discursive frames repudiate the idea of a universal model of 
democracy and emphasize the existence of multiple democratic models and paths to 
democratization. The Russian and Chinese authorities have demanded recognition of this 
diversity and equality of the various governance forms. Their own political systems evincing 
a powerful state personified by a popular leader were suggested as fully compatible with the 
notion of indigenous model of democracy and democratization. The Russian and Chinese 
perspectives are also shaped by their historical experiences, political interests, and value 
systems, in which security and order are given highest consideration.  
Both the US and EU have used their individual experiences and value systems as the 
benchmarks for international democratization. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former European 
Commissioner for External Relations, explained this point in her 2006 address to the 
Kazakh people, ‘We [the EU] have build up considerable know-how about transition 
processes, not least thanks to our latest enlargement. We put this know-how at your disposal 
and encourage you to make use of it’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). There has been virtually no 
discussion in either the US or EU of how the promoted practices and institutions can be 
secured on a long-term basis in Central Asia and whether the Western democratic models fit 
the circumstances of these states. Although the language of the US documents often 
recognizes the importance of the local contexts, neither the US implementation priorities 
nor discursive representations reflect the recognition of the unique historical trajectories and 
cultures of the Central Asian states. The same is true for the EU where the peculiar aspects 
of the Central Asian histories have been construed as the impediments to democratization. 
When the US did take the domestic context for democracy promotion into account, it used 
this information for designing viable measures within the pre-established democracy 
promotion framework. 
According to the theoretical and empirical scholarship on frames, effective discursive 
representations of an issue can exert powerful impact on the attitudes and behaviors of the 
targets of communication (Druckman 2004; Schön and Rein 1994). Democracy promotion 
frames that are compelling for the targets of democratization can be expected to command 
their support and influence their preferences, attitudes and behavior. The main criteria of the 
frames’ effectiveness are their cultural compatibility (sensitivity to national contexts), salience 
(importance of the themes and ideas conveyed in the discursive frames to the targets of 
communications), frames’ internal consistency and credibility of the agents (Beford and 
Show 2000).  
The space of the article does not allow to do justice to the national ‘models’ of 
democracy devised and actively disseminated by the leadership of Central Asian states (for 
further discussion, see Omelicheva, 2013). Central Asian republics have not been hostage to 
geopolitical rivalry of other actors, but active participants of ideological and geostrategic 
contestation in the region. Despite the flagrant violations of democratic principles in 
practice, all Central Asian states laid claims to being democratic. To reconcile discrepancies 
between the expectations of Western democratisers and their own political practices, the 
leadership of these republics have imbued ‘democracy’ with a unique substratum that 
allegedly corresponds to these countries’ national circumstances. These national ‘models’ 
have distinctive features but also share characteristics that are common to all. The strong 
state personified by a strong leader has become the crux of the Central Asian models of 
democracy, which also prioritize the goals of economic development over political 
liberalization. It has been argued that demands for security and order had to be met before 
democratization. All Central Asian governments have rejected the idea of the universal 
forms and methods of democratization and supported the principle of gradual political 
reforms.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Central Asian leadership has insisted on the 
low compatibility of Western models of democracy with the Central Asian socio-political 
contexts. While the West contends that democracy and the rule of law are the best 
guarantees for political stability, Central Asian governments affirm that only strong states 
can achieve stability and peace. The pre-eminence of the strong state in the Russian and 
Chinese frames make them more attuned to the views of the leadership of Central Asian 
countries then the Western perspectives encouraging political pluralism and a robust civil 
society. The Russian and Chinese emphasis on strong leadership and a viable economic 
system corresponds to the goals of the Central Asian governments. Their appeals to the 
diversity of democratic models and equality of alternative perspectives on development 
resonate stronger with the Central Asian leadership then the US and EU democracy 
promotion frames asserting a superiority of the liberal institutions. Certainly, the norms 
promoted by the Russian and Chinese governments match the Central Asian governments’ 
interests in strengthening their power bases, as opposed to the Western ideas of democracy, 
which are perceived as threatening to the survival of the governing regimes. This interest-
based compatibility of ideas promoted by Russia and China enables future learning from the 
expectations of Moscow and Beijing and provides the Central Asian leaders with the 
ideological cushion for resisting international democratization.  
To increase the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion frames, greater 
consideration should be given to a wide range of social, political, and cultural factors in the 
region. Western democratization agents must commit more time and energy to learning 
about these countries, including through the long-term residence in these states. There must 
be will to transcend the excepted ways of thinking and institutional perspectives on the social 
and political life in these republics, and allow for the greater creativity in the programs’ 
design. Although, it is rather unrealistic to expect the reconciling of normative and pragmatic 
agendas by international donors, what should be avoided is the pursuit of strategic interests 
under the guise of advance of democracy and human rights. In their engagements with 
Central Asian governments, the US and EU must clearly demarcate their support for 
democracy from geostrategic cooperation. 
Approaching democracy and democracy promotion as contentious ideas allows 
researchers examine ways in which these concepts are conceived and challenged by the 
agents and targets of democratization. Frame analysis is well suited to the task of studying 
the variety of meanings and discursive representations that can be embedded in the language 
and practices of democracy promotion abroad. Furthermore, by focusing on conceptual, 
discursive, and implementation dimensions of democracy promotion spotlighted in this 
special issue researchers can observe how ideological contestation accompanying democracy 
promotion is concurrent to states’ geopolitical competition. It serves as a potent ideological 
weapon in the armory of states’ geopolitical instruments. The differences in ‘mental frames’ 
and discursive representations of democracy and alternative models of governances between 
the US/EU and Russia/China as well as changes occurring to the meanings of these 
concepts over time reflect political and socio-economic circumstances of domestic politics 
and ebbs and flows of geostrategic imperatives in international relations. 
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